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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LEROY HAvVKINS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LORENE PERRY, .A.LF·RED T.
PERRY, and MRS. R. A. SCRIEVER, sometimes kno,vn as THEL1\I.A_ SCRIEVER,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case~No.

7786

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the latter part of May, 1943 (page· 19) plaintiff,
at that time a minor sixteen years of age (page 19, line
24; page 27, line 22), com1nenced working with defendant A. T. Perry (page 37, line 30), a minister of the
Gospel (page 21, line 4; page 50, line 1), and a relative
of plaintiffs (page 35, lines 22 and 23). About the middle of July, 1943 defendant, A. T. Perry, induced the
plaintiff to give said defendant $300.00 to make a down
pa)Tlnent on a hon1e at 2~3 East 7th South (pages 2·5, 26,
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27 and 62) which $300.00· was given to said defendant
in the presence of three witnesses (pages 25, 51, 63 and
68). At the time the money was given to said defendant,
A. T. Perry, said defendant told plaintiff that the property would be taken in the name of Perry and when the
plaintiff became of age it would be transferred to plaintiff (page 29, line 1; page 36, line 19; page 48, line 10;
page 71, line 15) .
On July 15, 1943 the contract of purchase was entered into having the names of J. F'. Taylor as the seller
and A. T. Perry and Lorene Perry, his wife, as the
buyers (see Exhibit A).
That the plaintiff has resided in the home from the
time of purchase up to the present time (pages 30, 78,
80 and 81) while the defendants lived in the house only
· until the early part of 1944 (pages 30, 43, 75, 78 and 82).
The plaintiff has made all the monthly payments
from the beginning of the contract until the present time
(page 20, lines 29, 30; page 31, line 1), and is still making the monthly payments.
,The . Perrys and the Hawkins resided in the home
from the time of the purchase until January of 1944, at
which time the Perrys went to Portland, Oregon (page
82'). Mrs. Perry claims that Mr. Hawkins was supposed
to pay rent, pay the note and bank the money, but there
was no testimony -that either Mr. Perry or Mrs. Perry,
either by mail, directly or ip.directly, even though they
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caine through Salt Lake in 1945 and saw the plaintiff,
ever asked the plaintiff for an accounting, or for any
1noney at all fro1n the ti1ne they left Salt Lake to the
tin1e J)frs. Perry came to Salt Lake in August, 1949,
at which ti1ne nirs. Perry testified she asked the plaintiff for son1e n1oney and plaintiff told defendant, Lorene
Perry, he didn't have any for her (pages 85 and 86).
Mrs. Perry never did pe!sonally tell the plaintiff· or
clailn that the ho1ne was hers and she never did ask if
she could move into her own home, or that it be given
back to her (page 94, ~line 6). She did say they asked
for $60.00 from plaintiff and received it (page 19) and she
also asked for $50.00 which the plaintiff never sent to
her (page 95). In neither case was the demand made· as
if it was for money due and owing.
The first time defendant, Lorene Perry, ·ever asked
for the return of the property to. her was· after March
14, 1950 after she had obtained her divorce from Mr.
Perry on March 14, 1950 (page 87) and then notice was
given by her attorney, a Mr. Hanni (page 86). See
Exhibit "C", at which time there was no demand for
rent, and notice wasn't given on the basis of non-payment for rent, but on the basis of a regular month to
month tenancy.
In the divorce decree Mrs. Perry was awarded the
property but there was no showing that the plaintiff
was served with sunnnons or ever advised that said real
property was the subject matter of the suit, so that
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the decree which was entered on March 14, 1950 would
only settle the property rights between· defendants,
A. T. Perry and Lorene Perry, and would have abso~
lutely no effect upon plaintiff's interest.
There is a direct conflict as to who made the payments on the original contract and note. The plaintiff
definitely testified that he made all the payments personally, except once or twice when plaintiff gave Mrs.
Perry the payments when he had to go to work (pages
30, 42 and 66). Mrs. Perry avers that she or her husband
made the payments (pages 76, 77, 97 and 99). Actually
there was no testimony to show that the ·Perrys made
payments at all after January, 1944 when they left
Salt Lake, and only six payments had become due up
to the time the Perry left, so that the $100.00 per month
payments were not paid up at the time of leaving.
Mrs. Perry contended that the plaintiff was to pay
rent himself, collect the rent on the apartment and make
payments o:h the ,contract from the money collected
(pages 82 and 83), while the plaintiff denies ever being
a tenant (pages 33, 43 and 44). There was no evidence
of any kind that the defendant, Perry, ever asked the
plaintiff how much money plaintiff was supposed to have
banked or collected or paid under the alleged instructions (page 84, lines 8 and 11). The only checking as to
the status of the payments with the agent of defendant,
Scriever, was done by Mrs. Perry after she returned
in August of 1949 (pages 101 and 102).
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The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants and decree was entered January
7, 1951 (pages 115 to ·119) declaring the defendants,
Perry, to be trustees for the use and benefit of the
plaintiff and thereafter the court, upon motion of the
defendants, having denied a motion for a new trial, made
a minute order modifying the decree only to the extent
that Lorene Perry has an equity in the property in the
sum of $400.00 and except for such modification the
judgment and decree was to stand as entered (page 123),
and an a1nended decree entered so providing on December 11, 1951. Defendants have appealed the amended
decree and the respondent cross appealed ~rom that
portion of the amended decree allowing the defendants
a lien of $400.00 (page 157) and the portion awarding
to defendant Scriever $50.00 for attorney's fees.
STATEMENT. OF· POINTS.

I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAS MAD~ SUFFIClENT FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES TO SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT.

II.
THAT FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES ARE
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.

III.
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
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PORT THE DECREE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO THE FULL BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.

IV.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT FINDINGS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARDING OF A $400.00 LIEN AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S
INTEREST OR THE AWARDING OF $50.00 ATTORNEY'S
FEE TO DEFENDANT SCRIEVER.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.

In this case the plaintiff admits that he is relying
on the doctrine of constructive trust wherein equity
requires the ·imposition of trust in such cases as the
present instance.
There are two theories on which a trust can be
imposed upon this property: First, the enforcement of,
a trust based on the purchase money agreement called
a Resulting Trust and Second, the imposition of a Constructive Trust which may be imposed by reason of
fraud, or confidential or fiduciary relationship.
With respect to the resulting trusts generally,
Bogart on Trust, S.ection 452, page 1350 states that resulting trusts and uses were well known before the
statute of frauds was written in 1786, and that the stat-
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ute of frauds had no application to resulting or constructive trust, and that the eighth section to old English
rule referring back to the seventh section requiring instrmuents to be in writing stated:
"The seventh section has no application to
trusts \Yhich arise or result by the implication of
the law."
Quoting further :
""In the U. S. where every express trust of
realty is required to be manifested or proved by
writing there is a section or clause corresponding
to the English act excepting resulting trust. No
matter what the particular wording of the excepting clauses the courts have been unanimous in
holding that they were intended to cover all resulting and constructive trusts. It is, therefore·, comn1onplace that it is legally possible· for a cestui
of a resulting trust to obtain a decree in his
favor without introducing any documents setting
forth the trust or introducing any written evidence."
Quoting fron1 Section 454, pages 1357 and 1358 of
the same works it states:
"The courts of equity have therefore established the doctrine that normally the .payor of the
purchase price of property, real or personal, is
entitled to be decreed to be beneficiary of a trust
if the conveyance runs to another with the consent of the payor."
In the the particular case at hand that

IS

exactly
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the situation and the plaintiff is entitled to be declared
the trustee of the property under the, theory of resulting
trust..
The defendant makes much of the quotation, that to
impose a resulting trust the title must be taken according to the instructions of the person who pays the purchase money. This was done in the preseent instance, as
he took it in his name but added his wife's name. The
mere addition of his wife's name would neither add or
take away from the trust, and to cause a resulting trust
to be defeated by such a device would be a travesty on
justice, as any person could be instructed to take property in his own name and be given the money for that
purpose and then take the property in the name of still
a third party and defeat the trust.
In the present instance, if the, case fails as a resulting trust there is still the, fact that this is a constructive

trust.
In the present case if A. T. Perry took the property
with the intention of having his wife's name put on the
contract to defeat the very purpose of the payment of
the $300.00 then there would have been an intentionally
false and verbal promise accompanied by an element of
positive fraud and the trust would be ex maleficio as
set forth in Chadwick v. Arnold as quQted in appellants'
brief. This is supported by Scott on Trusts, see Sec.
440.1, page 2243. It states as follows:
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..,Silnilarly ~~A" can enforce a constructive
trust where he directed HB" to use "A's" money
in purchasing land in the name of "A" but "B"
wrongfully used ''A's" Inoney in purchasing the
land in his o'vn nan1e. Here also "A" can follow
his money into the land. In these cases "B" holds
the land upon a constructive trust rather than a
resulting trust."
In Scott as quoted by appellant we see nothing that
'vould defeat the trust. Putting Lorene Perry's name
on the contract would only change the trust from resulting to constructive trust.
The law has set up the constructive trust to do away
with· the fraud in the taking of property, and the courts
have said, as set forth in Bogart on Trust, in Section
481, page 76, that where p·ersons act by an intermediary,
Ruch as minors, spendthrifts, or mentally incompetent
there is a fiduciary relationship. Equity has always
taken an ·active interest of fostering and protecting these
intimate relationships which it· calls fiduciary. It has
exclusively developed one of the most important of relationships, nan1ely: the trust.
Section 481, pages 78 and 79 states:
"The exact lin1it of the ter1n, "fiduciary relations are i1npossible of statement." Equity refuses to bind itself by an all inclusive definition.
It reserves the freedon1 to declare relationships
to be fiduciary upon the particular facts of the
case."

10
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Quoting further on "Confidential Relationships,"
page 81, Section 482, under constructive trust, it states:
"But there are other cases where there are
just as great intimacy, disclosure of secrets,
intrusting of power and superiority of position
in the case of the representative but where the
law has no special designation for the position
of the parties it cannot be called trustee or executorship and yet is so similar in its operation that
it should have like results."
It sets out the case of the sickly father deeding
property to his son to be used for a specific purpose
which failed as a specific trust, but due to the kinship
the court felt justified in holding the son to be trustee
of the father at the time the deed was made and that
the disparity of position because of age, youth, education
or mental weakness in confidential relationships may
cause the court to look upon the representative as trustee
for the weaker party and cites the parishioner and the
priest, supported by numerous cases cited in annotation
on pages 81 to 87 under the section. This theory is shown
at pages 9'2 and 93 of the same work. It reads as follows:
"Some other courts have stated that in a
confidential relationship the principal is entitled
to believe the statute of fraud will not be asserted.
"Others have asserted the confidential relation doctrine is employed to prevent the statute
of frauds from being an instrument of fraud."
Mr. Tanner sets forth that the statute of frauds

.Jf
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prevent~

a deed under an oral pro1nise to be held for

another.
Section 495 of the san1e \Vorks states that a deed
under an oral pron1ise to hold for another generally is
prevented by the statute of frauds, but sets forth exceptional cases, and one of these is the confidential relationship, and under Section 496 quotes Foresman v. Fores·Jnan, 167 N.E. 148, as follows:
•'The rule is now well settled by repeated
judgments of this court that. the statute (Statute
of Frauds) does not obstruct the recognition of
c.onstructive trust affecting an interest in land
\Vith a confidential relationship would be abused
if there were repudiation of a trust already declared."
In Haws v. Jensen, Supra, the court further sets
forth the rule as follows :
"A constructive trust being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichn1ent arises by operation of the law and is not within the Statute of
Frauds."
In Haws v. Jensen there is also cited a quotation
from Scott on Trust, Volume 1, Section 44.2 as cited
and set forth verbatim in appellant's brief at page 13.
This very clearly sets forth the theory that trusts will
be i1nposed 'vhere there is a fiduciary or confidential
relationship.

·&I,
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We do not disagree with the theory as cited in Chadwick v. Arnold., Sup,ra., but contend that the holding
strengthens the case of the respondent as the placing
of the name of defendant, Lorene Perry, on th.e contract
would be an element of positive fraud.
Inasmuch as there are also facts in the record which
clearly show a confidential or fiduciary relationship even
if the rule set forth in Chadwick v. Arnold fails as to
trusts ex maleficio then the ruling of Chadwick v. Arnold
would not apply and the rule as set forth in Haws v.
Jensen, Supra would more correctly state the law of this
particular case.
We cite appellant's brief, page 14, second paragraph
in support of our contention which requirements as there
set forth are exactly as we contend for the evidence in
this case: (1) there was confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) defendant took property in his own name
intending to convey when plaintiff reached his majority;
(3) defendant breached his agreement.
Clearly from all the evidence presented there is
ample ground for the establishment of a constructive
trust . by. reason of the fiduciary relationship, namely:
fellow workers working together and the plaintiff was
a relative of the defendant and on the same basis the
imposition of a constructive trust by reason of the confidential relationship between the two parties.
Further, the very disparity in the age as previously
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set forth would be sufficient grounds for equity to ilnpose a constructive trust.

· II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAS MADE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES TO SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT.

In the original findings of fact and conclusions of
law the trial court found that Alfred T. Perry entered
into a contract to purchase and was trustee for the
benefit of the plaintiff (page 115, paragraph 3).

On the 16th day of November, 1951 the Judge by
a minute order, shown at page 123, ordered that the
decree be modified and amended to provide that Lorene
Perry have an equity of $400.00 against the Perrys. That
except for the modification, the judgment and decree
were to remain as heretofore set up~
That prior thereto, after considerable argument and
discussion, by counsel for both sides, the judge in attempting to mollify (in the opinion of these attorneys) the
appellant had made the above order. Pursuant to the
form thereto and now relies on the failure to include,
above mentioned order the appellant prepared the
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law to conreversal. It has been held in a nurnber of instances that
con1plete findings in the amended findings as basis for
if there are to be specific findings on particular questions they must be requested. Here if the appellant had

l'f
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wanted findings he should have so requested them, and
we do ~ot feel now that he· should be· allowed to complain
that they are not complete findings. However, we feel
it would have no bearing on this particular case as the
findings set forth the fact that A. T. Perry was a trustee
for the plaintiff and there is substantial evidence to
support this.
The appellant contends that there should be. specific
findings as to the elements constituting the trust to require there be specific findings on these facts would
be entirely immaterial and incomp·etent. In order to
overthrow the decree there must be evidence to the contrary that there has not been a trust established or the
findings, if made, would not support the judgment and
'
findings as made.
Appellant cite·s Piper v. Eakle in 2 ·Pac. (2d) 909.
In that case there were no findings at all on the counter
claim and there was very much .dispute as to another
material fact on which no findings were made. Therefore, the court said there should be findings on these
two particular points. However, at page 910 the court .
held:
·
"That although a trial court erred in not
making findings upon all of the material issues
where it appears that no finqings other than in
support of the judgment would have been pe·rmissible, the judgment will be affirmed." Citing
Snyder v. Allen.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We. construe that to be the law .. in 'this particular
instance and refer ·to Bancroft's Oode·Pleadinf}; Practice
·and Remedies, Volurne-3 of·lO~Year··Supplem-ent, p·age
2203,- Section 1668 \V hich states :
·· ·
·.
"Recent cases have applied the settled rlile
that a judgment supported by findings will not
be reversed for failure to find on a material issue
where it appears that the findings if m1;1.de would
·
have been adverse to the appellant."
.LL\.nd cites under footnote 6 a number of cases from
numerous jurisdictions to support this proposition.
Among the1n is the case of Mutual Life· Insu)rdnce Cb.
of New York v. Frank, 50 Pac. (2nd), page 48~, with particular direction to 485 where it quotes·:
,.

.

\

"Appellant contends that the court' erred by
failing to find in accordance· with the evidence
that the insured gave the .policies -to the. appellant
by making her the beneficiary thereof' and delivering the instruments to her. The omission is harmless. It is apparent that specific findings on that
subject would be adverse to the appellant.. A
failure of the court to adopt findings upon an
issue raised by answer is not rev:ersible error
when the findings if made to support the j~dg~
ment would necessarily ·be adverse to the appellant."
Applying this. rule to the case _at. hand it is very
clear fro!? the judgment. and .decree as enter~d that the
findings if in support of the judgment and decree would
·have been adverse to the appellant. Further, there is
specific evidence of a promise on the p·art of A.· T. Perry,
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·a predecessor in interest to the ap·pellant, to hold the
property for the plaintiff and deed it to him when he
became of age (pages 25, 26, 27, 29, 52, 53, 541 55, 62,
63, 64, 69, 70, 71). This evidence was not even controverted and the very physical facts which are admitted
by the appellant tend to support the theory that the
appellant claimed no ownership until and at a later date.
There is also substantial evidence which is. not controverted to indicate that a fiduciary relationship existed
between the plaintiff and defendant, Alfred T. Perry..
The plaintiff was a boy of sixteen years of age, a relative of A. T. Perry, worked with A. T. Perry, and later
lived with him, and A. T. Perry was a ·minister of the
gospel (pages 19, 21, 27 and 35). None of these facts
were controverted and in view of the app-arent very close
relationship and the disparagement in the age there
could have been only one conclusion or one finding if
it had been made, that there was a fiduciary relation~
ship. This would be the only conclusion that could be
drawn in support of the judgment and decree and if so
it is not necessary to have a finding to support that proposition, as clearly shown by the law which has been
cited, which is the prevailing rule of law as to this jurisdiction.
The same facts of evidence as set forth above would
clearly indicate that if a finding had been made on a
confidential relationship, there could have been only one
result, namely, that a confidential relationship existed.
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So the court, if the Jinding had been made, could only
have found: (a) that the appellant or predecessor in interest promised to hold the property for the plaintiff and
deed to him at a later time; and (b) that either or both.a
confidential or fiduciary relationship existed or even further that .A... T. Perry fraudulently obtained the money
intending to have his wife's name put on the contract
to defeat the trust. In the first instance the constructive
trust could be established by the relationship and in the
second instance there would be fraud and a constructive
trust ex maleficio could be imposed, which in either case
would support the Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Decree, and as stated where it appears that the findings if made would be adverse to the appellant, if made,
the judgment will not be reversed for failure to find on
a material issue.

.

III.
THAT THE FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES
ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.

The court is referred to the original findings (page
115) the· ~ute order of November 16 (page 123) which
order clearly indicates that all findings and the judgment
as originally entered are still in effect except as to the
$400.00 lien, and to the amended findings (page 151).
From the reading of these findings it is clear that
the court found that the defendant A. L. Perry 'vas the
trustee for the plaintiff and that any 1noney, if paid by
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the Perrys, was paid for the use and .benefit of the plaintiff (see minute order (P. 123) ) and under all of the
evidence as previously set (orth and the law -governing
the sufficiency of findings in this case it is clear that the
court has made sufficient findings to support the judgment. (Refer to previous point for law and argument.) ·

IV.
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DECREE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO THE FULL BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.

After this case has been tried and argued to the
Court, the trial judge made the following observation
from which we. make a verbatim quotation. "Now the
·burden thereof, Mr. Shelton, if you want to assume it, i~
to establish that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Perry stands
in .any better posi.~ion~ than IY!r. Perry would in regard
to this pr'operty." The Court further said "Or, putting
it another way, sup-pose this had been a deed, now to
them in joint tenancy, which Mr. Perry_ had negotiated
and had~ just put his wife in as a joint tenant with him,
and he died hefore the property was conveyed so that the
title would vest in entirety in her, could she avoid the
trusteeship;~ In other words, could he avoid his trustee~
ship by simply taking a deed and making sorne one else
·a co-tenant or joint-tenant with him, and then dying~"
Counsel for the defendant, Lorene Perry never did

I#
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either in his oral argument or in his written brief attempt
to answer the .legal proposition as above stated by the
trial court. We have ~onsistently taken the position that
as a general rule of law, it is clearly established that the
beneficiary of a trust can follow the property into the
hands of any third person, unless said third person is ·a
bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without
notice.
Mrs. Perry in her examination on the witness stand
never once contended that she was either (a). a bona fide
purchaser, or (b) that she gave valuable consideration
for her alleged claim to tills real property. At the most,
the claim of Mrs. Perry and her counsel was to the effect
that her husband had p-aid s·ome money towards. the purchase price, and that was one reason why she was entitled
to an interest in the property. The evidence clearly
discloses that Mrs. Perry herself never p-aid anything
except a claimed $50.00 for her alleged claim, and any
alleged in the property is based only on the mere fact
that her husband placed her name on the deed, and that
as a result thereof, she became his joint owner in the
property. There is no evidence of any kind to show. that
she was even involved in the transaction between th~
plaintiff and her divorced husband (pages 81-82") .. In
answe-r to questions p·ropounded by her attorney, Mr.
Shelton, we quote verbatim (p. 81):

"Q. Was there ever any conversation between
you and Mr. Perry and Hawkins concerning

:.;.,
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the purchase of this

proper~y

at· 22·3 East 7th

S:outh~

A.

Not a thing. I never knew anything about it,
heard anything about it, until this past year
after the court had signed me my decree
granting me that. That is when all this junk
came up· about this property."

We cite:
"It is a clearly established principle in
equity jurisprudence that whenever a trustee has
been guilty of a breach of trust, and has transferred, by sale or otherwise, the trust property
or funds to any third person, the cestui que trust
has full right to follow such property or funds into
the hands of such person unless he stands in the
predicament of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice.· Oliver v. Piatt,
(1845} 3 How. (U.S.) 333, 11 L. ed. 622.
"The general rule is that the beneficiary who
can trace his money or property misappropriated
by the trustee may recover it from any transferee
who did not receive it for value without notice of
its character. Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank
(1873) 52 N. Y. 1."
Further, Am. Jur. Volume 54, Section 272 on trustees, at page 215 states :
"That marriage, relationship between a trustee and his transferee does not constitute such
value as to cut off equities of a beneficiary in
trust property or funds in the hands of the transferee."
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In support of this proposition in Hungerferd v.
C1l,rtis, 110 .A.tlantic 650, the Court held that the- deposit
of trust funds in the name of a wife, did not entitle the
wife to the funds and that they could be ;recovered.
In Tiffany on real property, at page 1093, Section
483, it is stated:
"In order to claim priority as against one
'vhose rights have first accrued, one must be a
purchaser for value, and one who receives a conveyance based on a merely 'good,' as distinguished
from a 'valuable,' consideration, takes subject to
all prior conveyances or incumbrances."

It further states :
"One is not a purchaser for a valuable consideration, within the rule, unless he has parted
with money or money's worth in consideration of
the conveyance."
Counsel for the defendant during the oral arguments
at the conclusion of the trial, contended among other
things, that the divorce decree gave her the interest of her
divorced husband in lieu of alimony, and, therefore, she
took whatever interest her husband had in said property
and gave a valuahle consideration.
To refute tnis contention, the divorce decree introduced in the case of Lorene Perry v. Alfred T. Perry, No.
87337 in the Third Judicial District Court, and we particularly called to the trial court's attention, paragraphs
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3, 4, 5 ·and 6 of that decree. In paragraph 3 of the decree,
she was awarded the custody of the minor children. In
paragraph 4 of said decree she was awarded all of defendant's interest in and to the ho"ll:sehold furnishings.
In paragraph 5 of said decree, she was awarded $15 per
month for each of the five children as support money,
and in paragraph 6 of said decree she was awarded $15
per month as alimony. Therefore, the appellant's contention above mentioned falls flat because of the express
provisions in said decree as enumerated above.
It is significant to note that Mrs. Perry never at any
time made any demand for the regular payment to her of
any money received ~from rent of the premises, and it is
further significant to note that from 1943 or 1944 until
the divorce was granted in 1950, a period of about seven
years did Mrs. Lorene Perry, the appellant in this case,
ever assert verbally, in writing, or by attorney or by
agent; that she was the owner of, or the part owner, or
real property in question until after her divorce decree
that she claimed anf right, title or interest in and to the
was granted to her (page 100). When she· moved to Salt
Lake ·city in August of 1949 she didn't go to 223 East 7th
South Street in Salt Lake City, and say to Mr. or Mrs.
Hawkins or to the both of them "This is my house, you
are only the caretaker here, I am going to move in and
take possession of my property." She never even went
near the Hawkins' and she never went near the real property in question, but instead she took rooms at the St.
Louis Hotel, 243 West South Temple in Salt Lake City
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for two months (page 103). Then she went to Ogden and
stayed for two or three weeks, and then she moved to
a Mrs. Washington's house and stayed there approximately ten days to two weeks (page 104), and then sh_e
went to Portland, Oregon, 'vhere she stayed until she
secured her divorce (page 105). Does this appear to he
the norinal conduct of a person who later comes into
Court and claims the o'vnership to a valuable piece of
property1 It is significant to note that after she secured
her divorce decree and learned that the decree provided
that she might have some interest in the real pTope,rty
here involved, she retained an attorney to serve a notice
on the plaintiff herein in which she aske·d for possession
of the premises, but never made any demand for any
back rent (p. 109). She admitted on the stand that she
wanted the property for herself and that she even tried
to get a loan on the property although she had· not even
once in seven years, advised the plaintiff that she felt
she had an interest in said real property.
vVe therefore submit to the court from the facts as
shown by the transcript and from the law as quoted
above, it is very clear that a trust was established; that
there is very little evidence that the defendant Lorene
Perry at any time paid anything for the property which
she now claims, that she stands in no better position than
her divorced husband stood at the time the divorce decree was entered, and that she gave nothing in the way of
a valuable consideration for the recital in the divorce decree in her favor. To hold otherwise but have the effect
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of quieting title and--determining rights as against persons, not parties to a suit, which is contrary to law and
equity.

We submit this final questio.n to the court in substanti~tion of our position. Let us assume no divorce
decree had been entered as between the Perrys, could
Mr. Perry himself by any stretch of the imagination successfully defend the action herein brought by the plaintiff~ In view of the fact that four witnesses have testified under oath that when the plaintiff paid the $300 to
Perry, that Perry agreed to purchase the property in his
own name and hold the same for· the plaintiff, who was
then a minor, could Perry now come into court and say,
"this property is mine because I paid some· of my money
along with the purchase price money advanced by the
plaintiff~" The answer is obvious, Perry himself wouldn't have a leg to stand on - and if he didn't ha:ve any
right, title and interest in the property, how then can his
wife now successfully contend that she is the owner of
pro:rerty which she received from her divorced husband,
who didn't own the property himself~

We also again· refer to the evidence which was uncontroverted that the money paid to A. T. Perry under
an agreement to transfer to the plaintiff when he be.came
of age and fact of the confidential or fiduciary relationship ·is clearly shown by the evidence.
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IV. (a)
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO LORENE PERRY AS
BEING DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST ..

The appellant makes much of the fact that the testiInony was hearsay as to Lorene Perry. This is true as it
was made out of her presence. However, there is a well
established rule of law which permits the introduction
of statements which are declarations against interest.
Appellant contends that the statements could not be
heard against Lorene Perry. As previously p,ointed out
she was in exactly the same position as A. T. Perry, as she
was a successor in interest to A. T.. Perry not being a
bona fide purchaser and therefore subject to all the defenses which might be raised as against A. T. Perry.
It has been clearly established that such is the case
when the court held in effect that Lorene Perry was not a
bona fide purchaser.
It has been brought out in appellant's brief that before a declaration against interest is admissible the declarant must have some present interest at the time the
statement is made. This is only another way of saying
that declarant cannot make a statement against interest
if he has no interest. For example: "A" says I am
going to deed the State Fair Grounds to "B" to be held
in trust for "C." At the time "A" makes the statement
"A" does not own any interest whatsoever in the State
Fair Grounds. "A" later acquires the title to the State
Fair Grounds and subsequently makes a deed to "B"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

without at that time saying anything about a trust in
favor of "C." It is held that the early statement about
the trust is not admissible as it was not against declarant's interest at the ti1ne it was made.
This would not be true in the present instance as
there would clearly be a declaration against interest as
A. T. Perry received the. $300.00 for a specific purpose
and he actually had possession of the money at the time
of making the statements and any statements made by
him in derrogation of his right of ownership of the money
or in derrogation of his right to use it as he saw fit would
clearly be admissible as a declaration against interest.
The fact that he did not then have an interest in the· property would be immaterial, as· his declaration is as to the
m0ney and the statements were clearly against his interest and would be adn1issible to show under what ter1ns
and conditions A. T. Perry accepted the money.
In Jones on evidence, Second Edition, Page 1789, ·
s.ection 975, it states:
. "Admission made by a party or one in privity
to a party need only have been made at son1e time
during an existence of an interest contrary to such
admission in order to be admissible."
This is clearly true in this instance as the statement
contrary to the interest of A. T. Perry was to the effect
that he was accepting the money with the idea that the
property would be taken in his narne and held in trust
for the plaintiff.
.-
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In foot note under Section 975 is quoted fro1n Bibb v.
Hunter, 79 Ala. 351 as follows:
~'A

declaration of trust made by the trustee
at the tin1e of the creation of the trust has been
held sufficient to establish the existence the-reof
as against hin1."
This is supported by nun1erous cases as cited.
In .i.ll oore v. Butler, 48 New Han1pshire 161, it states:
~'However,

a declaration of trust 1nade by a
trustee has been held to be binding."

In the last two cases these would be just as admissible against a privity of interest with the trustee as is
clearly shown in Jones on Evidence.
In further support of the theory that the statements
could be used, Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, Second Ed.
Page 1776 states :
I

"Declarations of a husband made at the time
of purchase of certain property as to whether he
was buying for himself or his wife and as to
whose money was paying for the land are admissible on the issue as to whether a trust in favor of
the wife results."
Applying the principal stated in the ab~ve paragraphs "a fortiori" there would be more reason to hoJd
statements as to the purpose of the purchase in the creation of the trust as being admissible against a party
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other than a wife than there would be where the trust
was in favor of the wife.
The case of McDonald v. Miller 16 Northwestern
2d Page 270, supports the view of Haws v. Jensen in
practically every particular and states:
"In an action to establish a constructive trust
in connection with a conveyance of real estate a
declaration of the grantor made prior to or contemporaneously with an execution and delivery
of conveyance were admissible in support of a
trust under heresay rule .... "
And further states :
"There are two principles upon which a court
of equity acts in exercizing its remedial jurisdiction.... One is that it will not permit the Statute
of Frauds to be used in an instrun1ent of fraud
and the other that when a person through the influence of a confidential relation acquires title to
property or obtains an advantage which he cannot
conscientously retain, the court to prevent the
abuse of confidence will grant relief."
From the above citations there can only be one conclusion, namely: That the statements as to the trust are
declarations a,gainst the interest of A.T. Petry and as
such were admissible as to any p.arties in privity with
him or successors in interest to him who are not bona
fide purchasers.
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v.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT FINDINGS \VHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARDING OF A $400.00 LIEN AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST, OR TO TAX COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF
AND ASSESS PLAINTIFF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE OF
$50.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT, SCHRIEVER.

It is very clear that the order granting a $400.00 lien
on the property in favor of the appellant was made to appease or mollify the appellant as there is not sufficient
evidence in the record to indicate that appellant or her
husband paid n1oney as stated.
We have filed a cross appeal from the order o.f _the _
court from paragraph 3 of the amended decree signed by
the trial judge in which the plaintiff was ordered to pay
to defendant, Thelma Catherine Scriever, the sum of $50
for the use and benefit of her attorney, and also with respect to paragraph 5 herein, the court , required each
party to bear his owri costs. Concerning the award of
attorney's fees to Mrs~ Scriever, we are unable to find
any statutory authority granting the court authority
to make such an award, nor do we find any case ever cited
by the Supreme Court of this state that would justify
the trial court to make such an award, and we, therefore, pray that that portion of the Court's order be reversed.
We also cross appealed fro1n paragraph 2 of the
an1ended decree entered December 11, 1951 wherein the

30
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defendant, Lorene Perry was allowed the sum of $400
and interest from July 15, 1943 at the rate of 6%. Since
the court in its amended decree found that the plaintiff
was entitled to judgment against the defendant, and declaring that he is the true and lawful purchaser under
the uniform real estate contract of July 15, 1943, and that.
the defendants, Alfred T. Perry had no right, title or interest in said property except said $400, we contend that
being the prevailing party we are entitled to have the
costs taxed against the defendant, Lorene Perry, and
we further submit that the uncorroborated statement of
the defendant that she or her husband paid $100 a month
for five or six months, without producing any receipts
in court or without producing any records or documents
by the party to whom the alleged payments were made,
is nothing but a self-serving statement and was made
sole~y for the purpose of trying to salvage something
out of the property in the event that the court ruled
against her (page 79).

CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully represents to the
Honorable c·ourt that the judgment of the lower court
should be sustained as to-the imposition of the trust as
there is ample and sufficient evidence to support ·an the
necessary findings and to support the judgment and decree as entered, giving the respondents the full, beneficial interest in the property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That the respondents' cross appeal be granted and
the lien and costs as asse-ssed against the respondent be
stricken and disallo,ved.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R .. RICH
FAUX, RICH and KIRTON
and
RAYMOND R. BRADY
Attorneys for Respondent
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